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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the Copenhagen (2009), Cancun (2010), Durban (2011), Doha (2012), and 
Warsaw (2013) meetings, it is difficult to be optimistic about our chances of avoiding 
increases in global average temperature and associated changes to the climate that will not 
only damage many communities and countries but also destroy species and eco-systems.
1
 In 
particular, current attempts to construct a regime to deal with climate change hardly seem 
capable of averting potentially tragic collective action failure. It is widely accepted that the 
main factor causing such collective action failure is states’ calculations about the degree to 
which it is rational for them to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases or take other 
measures that might slow down climate change. Such calculations are understood to be based 
on economic factors such as perceived loss of competitiveness and opportunities foregone for 
economic growth, political factors such as the degree of electoral support and the power of the 
carbon lobby, and institutional factors governing the degree to which pressure from the 
electorate and organized groups translates into policy. Such factors seem to explain some of 
the variance in states’ willingness to make commitments on climate change (Harrison and 
McIntosh-Sundstrom 2010). From the perspective of collective action theory, the basic 
problems are that states (1) do not factor in the spillover effects their actions have on other 
states and (2) heavily discount future benefits. As a result, they tend to underinvest in 
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reducing emissions and, because controlling climate change is a global public good, to free-
ride on the actions taken by others (Ward 1996; Sandler 1997; Barrett 1999). The efficient 
Coasian solution, based on informal bargaining from a pre-existing distribution of enforceable 
property rights is inapplicable, because no such rights over climate stability exist in 
international law.  
The idea that we are witnessing a collective action failure over climate change, together 
with the idea that states choose efficient means to attain economic and political goals that are 
largely independent of the domestic and international political processes and institutions built 
around climate change, make the application of rational choice models relevant. The rational 
choice approach has been widely criticized, though. In particular, some liberal institutionalists 
argue that this approach ignores the way political processes, institutions, and ideas frame the 
possibilities of efficient contracting and, perhaps more significantly, alter states’ underlying 
preferences and the way they perceive problems (Young 1999). To be sure, the fact that 
climate change is on the international agenda is a clear indication that ideas matter. For good, 
or quite possibly for ill (Victor 2011), the institutional architecture of the Kyoto Protocol 
influences developments. The influence of international processes on voters and corporate 
interests has contributed to the willingness of some states (and notably the EU) to adopt a 
frontrunner role in terms of climate policy. Nevertheless, climate change illustrates the power 
of the rational choice approach. 
 Though the idea of collective action failure seems a powerful one, an important issue is 
whether we need to develop more sophisticated models. After all, the basic understanding of 
collective action failure in public good games goes right back to the work of Olson (1965). 
However, we do need to press further. Even if states’ underlying goals are fixed, the best 
policies for attaining those goals will often depend on what other states do, particularly for the 
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largest emitters. The importance of such strategic interdependence and the use of game-
theoretic tools to model it were introduced into the international relations literature on 
collective action in the 1980s (Axelrod 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Keohane 1984). In 
cases where interaction can be characterized as a game, states’ underlying preferences cannot 
be read off directly from their actions, as is often assumed in accounts of climate change 
politics found in the policy studies and comparative politics literatures. In a one-shot, two-
player Prisoner’s Dilemma, it is obvious what a rational player will do, because each player 
has a dominant strategy of non-cooperation. However, it is likely that such dominant 
strategies do not exist in climate change politics (Dasgupta and Heal 1980, 21). Nor do such 
strategies exist in most of the models we review in this article. Game theory helps us 
understand how states behave in strategically complex environments. 
In section 2, we describe some rather discouraging results offered by the formal modeling 
literature about the prospects for effective climate cooperation. The models we consider 
highlight the importance of incentives, while downplaying the role of other factors, such as 
social norms. It is therefore pertinent to say that we agree that norms can sometimes “move 
mountains” (Barrett 2007, 21). However, incentives are surely important, too. In section 3, we 
go on to consider some formal models suggesting that there might be light at the end of the 
tunnel after all. Finally, in section 4 we conclude by outlining three general lessons about 
international climate cooperation and six more specific lessons about treaty design that can be 
derived from models reviewed in this article. 
Given the large number of models we consider, space does not permit us to describe and 
analyze each model in detail. Instead we offer a fairly rough sketch of each model and outline 
the main results. We hope readers will get the main message from each model and encourage 
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them to consult the referenced literature for more details on models they find particularly 
interesting. 
 
 
2. Some Discouraging Results on Climate Change Cooperation  
A climate agreement will be effective to the extent that it successfully mitigates 
anthropogenic climate change. Thus, effectiveness requires broad (and stable) participation, 
deep commitments by the participating countries, and high compliance rates. Importantly, all 
of these three requirements must be met; meeting only one or two of them is of little or no 
help (Barrett and Stavins 2003). 
Because the avoidance of climate change is a global public good, countries have an 
incentive to free ride on other countries’ mitigation efforts. This will generally cause 
suboptimal global abatement levels (Finus 2001; Finus and Rundshagen 2003). In the case of 
the Kyoto protocol (Kyoto 1), at least five different forms of free riding may be distinguished 
(Hovi et al. 2013). First, a few countries − most importantly the United States − never ratified. 
Second, Canada ratified the agreement (December 2002) and thus participated initially, but 
later gave notice of its withdrawal (December 2011). Third, the non-Annex I countries 
(developing countries) ratified without a legally binding emissions limitation target. Fourth, 
several East European countries ratified with a legally binding but very lax commitment (the 
“hot air” problem). Finally, there is the possibility of noncompliance. At the time of writing it 
is not yet clear whether all remaining Annex I countries actually met their targets for the first 
commitment period. 
The problem of suboptimal global abatement has been addressed by a significant amount 
of formal work (prominent examples include Barrett 1994, 1999, 2002, 2003; Carraro and 
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Siniscalco 1992, 1993; Hoel 1992; Tulkens 1979). This formal work has aimed at identifying 
the conditions for formation of multilateral agreements (or coalitions) that are stable or self-
enforcing.
2
 The need for self-enforcement (or stability) originates from the anarchic character 
of the international system, meaning that no supranational authority can be relied upon for 
enforcement, a point agreed to by both liberal institutionalists and realists. 
 
2.1 Coalition models 
Models of international climate cooperation differ both with respect to which stability concept 
they use and in the way they specify countries’ payoff functions. However, they can largely 
be categorized into two major types − coalition models and repeated-game models (Finus and 
Rundshagen 2003).
3 
Coalition models aim to analyze the conditions for the formation of 
stable coalitions. A coalition is said to be internally stable if no member can benefit by exiting. 
Similarly, it is externally stable if no nonmember can benefit by joining. 
Carraro and Marchori (2003) distinguish three main coalition formation rules.
4
 The open 
membership rule specifies that each country is free to decide whether it will join or leave the 
coalition; hence, the coalition accepts as a member any country that wishes to join (e.g. 
Carraro and Siniscalco 1993). The exclusive membership rule means that a consensus among 
the existing members is required for a country to join; however, each country is free to exit 
the coalition (e.g. Yi and Shin 2000). Finally, under the coalition unanimity rule the formation 
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of a coalition requires a consensus among its members, meaning (1) that players are not free 
to join the coalition and (2) that if a country leaves, the coalition will cease to exist (e.g. 
Chander and Tulkens 1993).  
These three rules entail different incentives for countries. In the setting of a global public 
good, the open membership rule entails strong incentives for free riding that resemble those 
found in the Kyoto process. In contrast, the exclusive membership rule resembles the 
requirements for accession to the EU or the WTO, and may relate to Victor’s (2011) vision of 
a carbon club. Finally, the coalition unanimity rule can have a disciplining effect on countries, 
because it makes certain types of free riding (e.g. free riding by withdrawal) difficult. 
Coalition models depict international cooperation as a two-stage game. At stage 1, 
countries choose whether to participate (i.e., whether to be a signatory or a nonsignatory). At 
stage 2, they choose their abatement level (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Chander and Tulkens 
1992; Hoel 1992).
5
 Different models make different assumptions about behavior at each stage 
(Finus 2008).  We here focus on a basic version of the coalition model, while we consider a 
number of extensions in section 3.1. 
At stage 1, countries choose simultaneously (i.e., without knowing other countries’ 
choices) whether they will become a coalition member or not. The basic model assumes that 
only a single coalition (agreement) can be formed, so countries that do not join have no option 
but to act individually. Finally, the model assumes open membership, meaning that no 
country can be barred from joining the coalition if it wants to. 
At stage 2, the countries in the coalition choose their abatement levels jointly, aiming to 
maximize the combined payoff of all coalition members. Thus, the coalition internalizes the 
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external effects across members but not the external effects caused by members on 
nonmembers. In contrast, each country not in the coalition chooses the abatement level that 
maximizes its individual payoff. The model assumes that no side payments or issue linkages 
occur, and that decisions are made exclusively on the basis of material costs and benefits. 
Finally, these costs and benefits are assumed to be known with certainty (Finus 2008, 36).  
Coalition models are analyzed by backward induction, meaning that the analyst considers 
stage 2 before turning to stage 1. Thus, to decide what to do in stage 1, countries must map 
the implications that each stage 1 option will have at stage 2.  
The basic model provides very pessimistic predictions for climate-change cooperation. 
The reason is that stable coalitions are typically (very) small. Barrett (2005) provides a simple 
illustration, based on a linear benefit function and a quadratic cost function. Stability then 
requires that the coalition has exactly three members. This equilibrium is unique with regard 
to the number of member countries, but not with regard to their identities; as countries are 
assumed to be identical, any coalition consisting of exactly three countries will be stable. In a 
world with nearly 200 countries, a coalition of only three countries obviously cannot achieve 
very much.
6
 
 
2.2 Repeated-game models 
Whereas coalition models typically focus on participation, repeated-game models typically 
focus on compliance; they aim to analyze the conditions under which countries that 
participate in a climate agreement will meet their commitments.  
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A game is repeated if it can be reduced to a series of iterations of some smaller game. 
Applications of repeated-game models to climate change cooperation typically center on the 
infinitely repeated N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma (e.g. Asheim et al. 2006; Barrett 1999; 2003; 
Finus and Rundshagen 1998; Hovi and Froyn 2008) or some other set-up that resembles the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (e.g. Asheim and Holtsmark 2009; Heitzig et al. 2011; Kratzsch et al. 
2012). 
Before the game begins, countries are assumed to enter into an agreement that the parties 
must enforce throughout the game using credible threats (e.g., Barrett 1999, 2003). The 
structure of the game enables a country to obtain (at least short-term) net gains by free riding; 
hence, the agreement must specify a strategy that can enforce compliance. 
In most repeated-game models the only leverage available to a country is to threaten 
retaliation in kind, i.e. to respond to noncompliance by either terminating (permanently) or 
suspending (temporarily) its own commitment. Most older and some more recent repeated-
game literature assumes that cooperation is based on the so-called Grim Trigger strategy, by 
which even a single case of noncompliance will cause termination of the agreement. However, 
terminating an agreement will entail that the future gains from cooperation will be lost, 
thereby harming noncompliant countries and compliant countries alike. Thus, compliant 
countries will be better off if they abstain from implementing this punishment and simply 
resume cooperation as if no noncompliance had occurred. A country contemplating 
noncompliance will rationally foresee this possibility of renegotiation, meaning that the 
agreement’s stability will be undermined. 
To deter noncompliance an agreement must therefore be based on a strategy that can 
sustain the agreement as a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. While several notions of 
renegotiation proofness exist, most applications to climate change cooperation use Farrell and 
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Maskin’s (1989) notion of weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, which requires that not all 
players be strictly worse off by carrying out the punishment than by renegotiating. In other 
words, it must be in each party’s best interest to conform to the specified strategy and it must 
be in at least some country’s best interest to decline an invitation to renegotiate should a 
deviation from this strategy occur (Barrett 1999, 2003; Finus and Rundshagen 2003). 
Most of the recent repeated-game literature ensures (weak) renegotiation proofness by 
replacing the Grim Trigger strategy with some other strategy, typically one that prescribes 
less severe punishment for noncompliance. For example, Barrett (1999) uses a strategy he 
calls Getting Even and Asheim et al. (2006) use a strategy they call Penance. These two 
strategies resemble each other in that they both prescribe that a noncompliant country must 
endure punishment (pay penance) in one period of the repeated game before cooperation can 
be restarted. Assuming that countries do not discount future payoffs too heavily, these 
strategies ensure (1) that it is in the noncompliant country’s best interest to accept the 
punishment (because accepting the punishment will cause cooperation to be restarted after 
one period of punishment and will then last indefinitely unless another case of noncompliance 
occurs) and (2) that it is in some other country’s (or countries’) best interest to insist that the 
punishment be carried out before cooperation can be restarted. 
Early repeated-game models teach us that a climate treaty with broad participation and 
deep commitments is unlikely to be self-enforcing (in the sense of being weakly renegotiation 
proof). The reason is that renegotiation becomes more attractive the larger the number of 
parties. Suppose that each country faces only two options in each period, abate and not abate. 
Suppose furthermore that if member country j fails to abate in a given period, then the 
agreement requires country j to pay penance in the next period by playing abate while all 
other member countries are allowed to play not abate. By implementing this punishment the 
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punishing countries will obtain the not abate payoff resulting from just one (other) country 
playing abate. In contrast, by renegotiating they will obtain the payoff associated with the 
outcome where all member countries play abate. The latter payoff is an increasing function of 
the number of member countries; thus, the larger the number of member countries, the less 
likely that the agreement will be renegotiation proof. In other words, the agreement can be 
renegotiation proof only for a moderate number of participating countries. 
Using a repeated-game model, Barrett (2002) demonstrates that it is possible to construct 
what he calls a consensus treaty, i.e. a global agreement where all countries participate. 
However, he finds that a consensus treaty is possible only if commitments are unambitious 
(“shallow”). This finding suggests that a trade-off exists between the depth and the breadth of 
an agreement. 
More generally, infinitely repeated games have infinitely many equilibria if the rate at 
which players discount future benefits is low enough and the punishment for players breaking 
away from conditionally cooperative behavior is credible and great enough. Players’ interests 
generally diverge among the set of efficient equilibria. For example, one equilibrium may 
involve country A delaying the start of cooperation while country B starts immediately, while 
another may reverse this pattern. Games with divergent preferences over equilibria generate 
incentives for players to pre-commit to doing less, as in the paradigmatic examples of 
Chicken and the Battle of the Sexes.  Generally, the literature has not dealt with the dangers 
that arise from multiple equilibria where credible commitments can be made, but these are 
real dangers in climate change politics where countries can use (and perhaps overstate) the 
strength of domestic vetoes in order to commit to doing little. If credible, such commitments 
might cause others to do more, with the danger of a “collision” if too many countries pre-
commit (Ward 1996). 
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Despite the attention on renegotiation-proofness in the literature, relatively little has been 
written about how to theorize the actual process of climate-change negotiations. However, 
important exceptions do exist. For example, scholars have analyzed the implications for 
coalition formation of various aspects of the bargaining process, including North-South 
bargaining, uncertainty concerning the risk of catastrophic climate change, and the choice of 
policy instruments. Some of these scholars have used analytical models (Finus and 
Rundshagen, 1998; Altamirano-Cabrera et al. 2008; Caparrós et al. 2004; Caparrós and 
Pereau 2013; Urpelainen 2012a), whereas others have used game-theoretically based 
experiments (e.g. Barrett and Dannenberg 2012). 
Noting that multiple efficient ways of sharing the burden of dealing with climate change 
could be stable under conditional strategies in an infinitely repeated game, Grundig et al. 
(2001) suggest the application of the Nash-Rubinstein bargaining solution to predict which of 
these efficient and stable patterns will eventuate. This approach highlights breakdown payoffs 
and discount factors as determinants of the size of the burden a country will have to take up; 
however, it says little or nothing about negotiation dynamics. Putnam (1988) argues that 
international negotiation is deeply affected by the fact that negotiators have to get the consent 
of domestic veto players before they can settle. In particular, a negotiator who is weak 
domestically might obtain a good deal by claiming that domestic players would not agree to 
anything less – a role the US Congress has often played in climate negotiations. Concerning 
the possibility of bilateral climate deals between the EU and developing countries, Mansfield 
et al. (2007) show that the likelihood of bilateral deals generally go down with the number of 
domestic vetoes.  
 
2.3 Other approaches  
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The pessimistic conclusions reached by the coalition literature and the repeated-game 
literature sit well with inferences drawn by literature studying the conditions for international 
cooperation more generally. For example, the so-called law of the least ambitious program 
states that what can be achieved through international cooperation is limited to the platform 
advocated by the least enthusiastic party (Underdal 1980, 1998; see also Finus and 
Rundshagen 1998; Altamirano-Cabrera et al. 2008). The reason is that treaty formation 
usually requires unanimity (or consensus) among the participating countries, which enables 
the least enthusiastic party to veto any proposal that is more ambitious than its own. In 
principle, it might be possible to move beyond the least ambitious platform simply by 
accepting nonparticipation by the least ambitious country. Notice, however, that the resulting 
agreement will then still be limited to the platform preferred by the least ambitious remaining 
party. Moreover, in the case of global climate-change cooperation it will likely be difficult to 
move significantly beyond the least ambitious program by excluding the least ambitious party 
or parties. One reason is that the world’s largest emitters, China and the United States, are 
among the least ambitious countries. Clearly, if these two countries are omitted, the resulting 
agreement cannot be effective. Another reason is that the climate negotiations take place 
within the institutional structure of the UNFCCC, where decisions are made by consensus. 
China has repeatedly made it clear that it is unwilling to negotiate over climate change 
cooperation in any other forum. 
Even more pessimistic concerning the potential for effective cooperation is the relative-
gains literature, a branch of neorealist theory. This literature argues that states’ concern with 
relative gains may further constrain or even completely eliminate the potential for 
international cooperation (Snidal 1991). Grundig (2006) argues that relative-gains concerns 
are particularly important in cases that combine significant economic costs and a non-
excludable good. Thus, concerns with relative gains might help explain why cooperation to 
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mitigate climate change (high costs and a non-excludable good) has been far less successful 
than cooperation to avoid ozone depletion (non-excludable good but only moderate costs) and 
cooperation on international trade (high costs but excludable good).  
 
3. Light at the end of the tunnel? 
Our presentation thus far suggests that the prospects for solving the climate-change problem 
through international cooperation are very bleak indeed. Unfortunately, these depressing 
predictions correspond well with the lack of actual progress in the climate negotiations so far. 
Nevertheless, in this section we ask if there may be some light in the tunnel after all. Existing 
formal models offer several glimpses of hope. First, the coalition literature provides several 
ideas for enhancing cooperation by making large(r) coalitions stable. Second, a branch of the 
repeated-game literature suggests that it might in fact be possible to design a renegotiation-
proof climate agreement with broad (or even full) participation. Third, a string of papers have 
studied the potential of deposit-refund systems to enhance cooperation. Fourth, while the law 
of the least ambitious program clearly pinpoints some severe constraints on the prospects for 
cooperation, some scholars have suggested that this law nevertheless has its limits. Fifth, 
countries may use cooperative probes to build trust. Sixth, some scholars argue that 
cooperation might emerge in a completely decentralized fashion. Finally, the results from 
game-theoretically oriented experiments indicate that the prospects for cooperation might be 
better than the formal results mentioned in section 2 lead us to believe.    
 
3.1. Making larger coalitions stable 
We noted in section 2.2 that stable coalitions are typically (very) small, at least within the 
framework provided by what we have termed the basic version of the coalition model. An 
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obvious question is therefore whether modifying the assumptions of this basic version might 
produce more optimistic predictions concerning participation. A number of such 
modifications have been explored, with varying degrees of success. We here focus on seven – 
issue linkages, trade restrictions, multiple coalitions, minimum participation clauses, modest 
targets for emissions reductions, asymmetric countries, and alternative motivation such as 
equity concerns or strong reciprocity. 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1997) use a coalition model in which cooperation on climate 
change is linked to cooperation on technology R&D. The idea is that such linkage may 
increase participation, assuming that the fruits of technology R&D is a club good, so that 
countries that do not participate in climate-change cooperation may be excluded from sharing 
the fruits of technology R&D.
7
 Carraro and Siniscalco show that, given this crucial 
assumption, full cooperation is possible even with a very large number of countries. However, 
noting that such linkage is rare in international environmental agreements, others have 
questioned whether restricting the fruits of technology R&D to countries that cooperate on 
climate change is possible or if possible, in signatories’ best interest (e.g. Barrett 2005).  
Kim and Urpelainen (2013) consider whether technology competition in relation to 
emissions reductions affects states’ willingness to cooperate. In stage one, two states decide 
whether to cooperate over climate change. In stage two, they decide a subsidy level for their 
carbon reducing sector. States care both about climate change, industry profits (driven by 
relative competitiveness) and costs to consumers. In symmetric equilibria, the states cooperate 
in stage one if (1) the costs of subsidization are low enough and the states do not care too 
much about relative competitiveness or (2) they care a lot about competitiveness but costs are 
low enough and profits are high enough with large enough subsidies. 
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A second popular suggestion for increasing participation is that signatories impose trade 
restrictions on non-signatories. Consider a climate treaty that requires signatories to trade only 
with other signatories. Barrett (1997, 2005) finds that this requirement changes the game into 
Assurance. If few other countries participate in the treaty, the free rider incentive will 
dominate the cost of being excluded from trade with signatories, thereby making participation 
unattractive. However, if sufficiently many other countries participate, the cost from the trade 
restrictions will dominate the free-rider incentive; in particular, participation will be attractive 
for every country when all other countries are signatories. If this account is accurate, all that is 
needed to ensure a stable coalition with full participation is a simple clause stating that the 
treaty will enter into force only after the critical number of countries have ratified. For such a 
clause to solve the problem, however, the threat to exclude non-signatories from trade with 
signatories must be credible. As trade restrictions are often costly for both sides, it is far from 
obvious that this requirement is actually met (Barrett 1999, Aakre 2013).  
A special type of trade restrictions is so-called border-tax adjustments (BTAs), whereby 
the importing country (say, country A) imposes a CO2 tax on imported products. The CO2 tax 
due for a particular imported product equals the tax due for equivalent products produced in 
country A. Similarly, exporters from country A receive a refund of the CO2 tax it paid in 
country A during the production process (Ismer and Neuhoff 2007). Some scholars claim that 
BTAs are more credible than more extensive trade restrictions are; however, they are arguably 
also quite impractical: Calculating the CO2 emitted during the production of every exported or 
imported item will likely be cumbersome (Barrett 2003: 388). 
Third, several coalition models have modified the basic model’s assumption that only a 
single coalition is possible, thereby opening up for the possibility that more than one climate 
agreement may be negotiated. Typically, this modification leads to more than one coalition in 
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equilibrium and thus also to more overall cooperation than in the basic model. As a result, 
global welfare is usually higher with multiple agreements than with a single global accord 
(Bloch 1997; Carraro 1999, 2000). Subsequent studies of single versus multiple coalitions that 
use different assumptions concerning membership rules include Carraro and Marchiori (2003), 
Finus (2003), and Finus and Rundshagen (2003). These studies support the conclusion that 
multiple coalitions may be superior to a single coalition.
8
  
Fourth, some scholars have studied the impact of adding a stage that precedes the 
coalition and policy stages. At this first stage, countries choose the minimum number of 
countries that must participate if the treaty is to enter into force. This decision about the entry-
into-force clause is taken on the basis of countries’ anticipation of the decision’s implications 
at the second and third stages of the game. Assuming that adoption of an entry-into-force 
clause requires unanimity, Carraro et al. (2009) show that the presence of such a clause 
increases the equilibrium number of signatories, even when the clause is endogenous. 
Fifth, Finus and Maus (2008) argue that an important reason why only small coalitions 
are stable is the assumption that coalition members maximize their joint welfare when 
choosing their emissions in the second stage. The result is ambitious emission reduction 
targets and high incentives for free riding. They therefore consider the possibility of an 
agreement based on modest emissions reductions. Interestingly, they find that modesty might 
pay: It attracts higher participation levels and these higher participation levels may well 
compensate for less ambitious emissions reduction targets. In short, introducing more modest 
targets may cause global emissions to decrease in equilibrium. 
Sixth, while the basic model assumes that all countries are identical, some scholars have 
considered the impact of introducing asymmetric countries. With asymmetric countries, 
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additional coalitions may become stable through side payments. The reason is that countries 
that gain a lot from an agreement might be able to compensate countries that would not 
otherwise benefit from this agreement, thereby enticing the latter countries to join the 
coalition (and to remain members). Thus, a coalition no longer needs to be internally stable; it 
suffices that it is potentially internally stable (Carraro et al. 2006). The latter condition is met 
if the sum of benefits generated by the coalition is sufficiently large to permit a redistribution 
(through side payments) that leaves every member country better off inside the coalition than 
outside it. Since the set of internally stable coalitions is a subset of the set of potentially 
internally stable coalitions, it follows that larger (internally) stable coalitions may be possible 
when countries are asymmetric, provided that side payments are feasible (Holtsmark 2013; 
McGinty 2007). A major advantage of side payments is that they make it possible to break the 
link between actual abatement measures and economic burden sharing (McGinty 2014).  
Finally, some scholars have begun studying how and to what extent alternative 
motivations, such as concerns about fairness, might influence participation in international 
climate agreements. For example, Lange (2006) shows that inequality aversion concerning 
differences in developed countries’ abatement targets can make larger coalitions stable and 
cause stricter abatement. Similarly, Lange and Vogt (2003) find that in an N-country 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, cooperation by most or even all countries can constitute a Nash 
equilibrium if countries have a preference for equity. A similar result is obtained by Nyborg 
(2014), assuming that some or all countries are reciprocators rather than rational actors 
motivated by self-interest. However, Lange and Vogt (2003) also find that if countries are 
able to choose their abatement level from a continuum (instead of simply facing a binary 
choice between cooperate (abate) and defect (not abate), a preference for equity provides no 
improvement from the usual suboptimal Nash equilibrium. 
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While Lange and Vogt (2003) consider equity to be a matter of welfare comparisons, 
Grüning and Peters (2010) consider it to be a matter of observable measures such as 
abatement activities. A main finding in their model is that the policies of countries 
participating in a climate agreement tend to converge. This result is driven by the assumption 
that countries have a reluctance to pursue policies that are very different from those pursued 
by other participating countries.  
 
3.2 Making renegotiation-proof climate agreements consistent with broad or even full 
participation 
A series of recent articles have questioned the claim that a weakly renegotiation-proof 
agreement must necessarily entail either moderate participation or shallow commitments. 
Asheim et al. (2006) show that multiple (e.g., regional) agreements can enhance participation 
even when the depth of cooperation is taken as a given. Their model builds on Barrett (1999), 
but admits not only the possibility of negotiating a single global agreement but also that of 
negotiating two regional agreements. Identifying upper and lower bounds on the number of 
participating countries in each case, they show that two agreements can sustain a higher 
number of countries than a single global agreement can. Moreover, they demonstrate that a 
climate regime based on two agreements Pareto dominates a regime based on a single global 
agreement. Thus, their results mirror those of Carraro (1999, 2000) and others, using a 
coalition model (see section 3.1). 
Asheim et al.’s (2006) model follows Barrett’s (1999) in that noncompliance must be 
punished by all other participating countries in the perpetrator’s own region. Although this 
specification restricts the number of participating countries in each region, the existence of 
two agreements ensures that the total number of participating countries in the two agreements 
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combined becomes larger than the number of participating countries in a single global 
agreement. 
Froyn and Hovi (2008) extend Asheim et al.’s (2006) analysis by showing that full 
participation can be sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium even in a single 
global agreement. They demonstrate that even when no possibility exists for reducing 
abatement levels (players face only a binary choice in their model), participation can be 
increased by limiting the punishment for noncompliance. While Barrett’s Getting Even 
strategy allows all other participating countries to punish a noncompliant country, the strategy 
formulation used by Froyn and Hovi permits only a subset of the participating countries to 
punish. This strategy formulation makes it possible to study how the number of participating 
countries in equilibrium varies with the number of countries allowed to punish noncompliance. 
The authors provide lower and upper bounds on the number of punishing countries that is 
consistent with full participation (in weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium). 
The models studied by Barrett (1999), Asheim et al. (2006) and Froyn and Hovi (2008) 
assume that countries face a simple binary choice between cooperate (abate) and defect (not 
abate). Subsequent research has relaxed this assumption. Asheim and Holtsmark (2009) 
demonstrate that full participation is also possible when countries face a continuum of 
alternative emission levels. In their model, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be 
implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, provided that countries do not 
discount future payoffs too heavily. This result suggests that one need not choose between a 
narrow but deep agreement on one hand and a broad but shallow agreement on the other. 
However, Asheim and Holtsmark’s results also demonstrate that designing an enforcement 
system that makes a broad and deep agreement possible is far from a trivial matter.  
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The results obtained by Froyn and Hovi (2008) and by Asheim and Holtsmark (2009) are 
supported by Heitzig et al. (2011), who propose an enforcement system based on a simple 
dynamic strategy of linear compensation. This strategy redistributes abatement obligations 
according to past compliance levels, while keeping the overall abatement level constant across 
periods. Heitzig et al. (2011) show that their strategy can be used to implement any given 
allocation of emissions reductions, thereby casting further doubt about the existence of a 
“narrow but deep” versus “broad but shallow” tradeoff.9 
All models considered thus far in this section treat emissions as a flow variable. Thus, 
these models assume (usually implicitly) that emissions in a particular period have no lasting 
effect over time and that the set of possible per period payoffs remains constant over the 
entire repeated game. These assumptions are arguably implausible for applications to climate 
change cooperation. Kratzsch et al. (2012) invoke the more realistic assumption that 
greenhouse gas emissions build up a stock in the atmosphere over time and that it is the 
current stock that influences the climate. They show that broad or even full participation is 
possible also when the model takes into account that emitted gases is a stock variable that is 
depreciated only slowly over time, an important generalization of results from previous 
studies. Their model also enables them to identify certain effects that are difficult to spot 
when emissions are modeled as a flow variable. For example, they show that treaties with 
broad participation are more easily achieved for long-lasting gases than for short-lived ones. 
The reason is that long-lasting gases induce costs in more periods than short-lived gases do. 
                                                          
9
 This conclusion is also supported by Gilligan (2004). Using a multilateral bargaining model, he shows that such 
a trade-off does not exist for a wide class of cooperation problems. Gilligan traces the hypothesized broader-
deeper trade-off to the assumption that the participating countries must fix their policies at an identical level. In 
his model, when the multilateral agreement permits the participating countries to fix their policies at different 
levels, the broader-deeper trade-off ceases to exist. 
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3.3. Deposit-refund Systems 
Inspired by informal suggestions (Finus 2002; Finus 2008a; Gersbach 2006; Gersbach 2008) a 
string of papers have considered the possibility of using a deposit-refund system to enforce a 
new climate agreement.
10
 The emerging literature includes formal models (Gerber and 
Wichardt 2009; Gersbach and Winkler 2007; McEvoy 2013) as well as informal analysis 
(Hovi et al. 2012) and experimental studies (Cherry and McEvoy 2013, McEvoy 2013). The 
exact design of a deposit-refund system must take into account the type of climate agreement 
in question. Here we outline and discuss a design for a cap-and-trade type of agreement. 
11
 
The basic idea is that each member country must deposit a significant amount of hard 
currency at ratification and make additional yearly deposits until the commitment period 
begins. Should a member country decline to make further required deposits or fail to meet its 
emissions limitation target, it will forfeit all or part of its existing deposits (depending on the 
degree of noncompliance). In contrast, a country that makes all required deposits and meets 
its target will receive a full refund when the commitment period ends. 
As a tool for compliance enforcement, a deposit-refund system has several advantages 
(Hovi et al. 2012). First, it is simple. Whereas Kyoto’s compliance enforcement system is 
fairly complex, it is straightforward to comprehend a system whereby noncompliance will 
entail a loss of deposits. Second, punishment does not require cooperation by the 
noncompliant country, because the climate regime will control the deposits. This provides 
another contrast to Kyoto’s enforcement system, which is based on self-punishment (Barrett 
                                                          
10
 This subsection draws extensively on Hovi and Underdal (2014). 
11
 For an application to a climate agreement based on carbon taxes, see Gersbach (2006) and Gersbach and 
Winkler (2007). 
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2003). Third, provided that deposits exceed compliance costs, fulfilling one’s commitments 
will be better than being noncompliant and forfeiting one’s deposits. Fourth, the threatened 
punishment will be credible, because punishing a non-compliant Party will benefit the other 
Parties individually as well as collectively. Finally, whereas under the Kyoto Protocol a non-
compliant country could escape punishment by withdrawing from the treaty, a deposit system 
can easily be designed to make such escape infeasible. In particular, withdrawal before the 
commitment period ends might entail forfeiture of deposits. 
In theory, deposit-refund systems may be designed to ensure participation as well as 
compliance. For example, in a symmetric setting (i.e., all countries are identical), the treaty 
could state that entry into force will take place only when all countries have ratified and made 
the required deposits. Such a clause would make free riding through nonparticipation 
infeasible. As a result, the relative-gains problem is also reduced. When free-riding through 
nonparticipation is infeasible, relative-gains concerns no longer provide a motive for non-
participation − at least not in a symmetric setting. 
In practice, however, a deposit-refund system is implausible as a solution to the 
participation problem. First, the climate-change problem is entangled in many and serious 
asymmetries (e.g. Victor 2011), which makes the requirement that all countries must 
participate extremely impractical: If even a single country declines to make required deposits, 
the treaty will never enter into force. Second, it may not be credible that if one country 
declines to make required deposits, other countries will abstain from cooperating among 
themselves. The incentive to participate and make deposits critically hinges on such 
credibility. Finally, countries facing serious liquidity problems may be particularly reluctant 
to participate in a climate treaty based on a deposit-refund system. Thus, while a deposit-
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refund system could in principle work for compliance enforcement, it must be complemented 
by other measures (e.g., trade restrictions) for participation enforcement. 
 
3.4. The Law of the Least Ambitious Program Does Not Always Apply 
Around three quarters of the regimes coded by Breitmeier, Young, and Zürn (2006) operate 
on the basis of unanimity or consensus. Moreover, the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change operates by consensus, too. The Law of the Least Ambitious Program thus seems 
quite widely applicable. While many regimes formally operate using some version of 
qualified majority rule, at least on occasion (Hovi and Sprinz 2006), Underdal (1998) notes 
that the argument might still apply to the country most loath to see action among those vital to 
progress, for instance to the most loath member of a k-subgroup just large enough to make 
cooperation worthwhile if all its members cooperate. This would seem a potentially important 
argument given that perhaps no more than twelve states are crucial to making progress on 
climate change, based on their percentage of global emissions (Victor 2006). However, there 
are reasons to doubt that it always applies. First, if unanimity makes it difficult to ratchet up 
effectiveness beyond the level set by independent decision making when a regime is being 
built up, equally it makes it difficult to revert from an established policy to one with lower 
effectiveness (Hovi and Sprinz 2006). A “race to the bottom” is unlikely because it requires 
non-cooperative adjustments by industrialized countries. Second, a partial “race to the top” is 
likely because many emerging countries stand to gain from reduced negative externalities and 
the competitiveness problem is limited when the most lucrative export markets are already 
regulated. Finally, powerful industrialized countries with a high regulatory capacity benefit 
from a global expansion of regulation and opposition from veto players could be bought out 
through side payments to ensure unanimity (Barrett 2003; Ward et al. 2001). 
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In collective action games, side payments are transfers of private goods between players 
interacting over provision of a public good or concessions on policy dimensions relevant to 
such provision. Regarding climate change, an example of the former are transfers between the 
North and South under the Global Environment Facility; while an example of the latter are the 
flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol demanded by the United States and some 
other countries (Ward et al. 2001). Side payments are usually seen as a trade between agents 
with different degrees of concern about an issue. Barrett (2003: 335-354) shows that 
asymmetries in the provision function can lead to stable arrangements where some countries 
are induced to cooperate through side payments. He considers an n-player Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, where each member of a sub-group of 1 < k < n countries can benefit from 
cooperating so long as all the other members of the k-subgroup do so, but a group larger than 
k is unstable because for additional members costs exceed marginal benefits from 
environmental improvement.   In the symmetric version of the game, side payments cannot 
induce extra cooperation. Suppose that one extra country is induced to join by a side payment; 
then any member of the original k-subgroup will have an incentive to defect, because there 
are now more than k cooperators and defecting enables it to avoid the cost of making side 
payments.  
However, it is possible to induce more to join in an asymmetric game with two groups of 
countries, where an extra member in group 2 brings less marginal public good benefits than 
an extra member in group 1 does. It may then pay a member of the original k-subgroup to 
stick, given that it is a member of group 1. Defection would then reduce provision of the 
public good more than it has been increased through adding a member to group 2. Depending 
on the costs of making side payments and the degree of asymmetry between groups, equilibria 
in which k members of the first group cooperate and all members of the second group are 
induced to cooperate through side payments may be possible.  
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A number of models have provided further insights on how side payments may influence 
cooperation (e.g. Biancardi and Villani 2010; Carraro et al. 2006; Eyckmans and Finus 2004; 
Fuentes-Albero and Rubio 2010; Holtsmark 2013; McGinty 2007; McGinty 2011; Ward et al. 
2001; Weikard, 2009). Because we considered some of this work in section 3.1 and also 
because of space constraints, we here focus on the model analyzed by Ward et al. (2001).   
Unlike in Barrett’s model, in Ward et al.’s model (2001) side payments can also be used 
to block progress towards a more effective regime. Ward et al. assume the existence of a 
status quo point on the effectiveness dimension and that any country can veto change. 
Countries can locate either on the progressive side of the status quo or on the opposite side. 
One subset of the countries is a progressive coalition, another subset is a laggard coalition, 
while the remaining countries are unattached. The progressive coalition can make side 
payments to buy out opposition to progress from unattached countries, but the laggard 
coalition can attempt to counter such attempted buy-out. The progressive coalition must be 
highly predominant in its ability to overcome the laggard coalition’s efforts if progress is to 
come about, because the laggard coalition need only focus its attention on one veto, whereas 
the progressive coalition must bribe all unattached countries that are initially opposed to 
progress. Even if the progressive coalition is predominant enough to obtain some progress, the 
degree of progress will generally be limited. The progressive coalition member least eager on 
progress can generally ensure that its desired level of progress (or something close to it) is 
achieved by limiting its contributions to the funding of side payments.  
Ward et al. (2001) re-instate a version of the Law of the Least Ambitious Programme: 
progress will likely be limited to what the least ambitious member of the progressive coalition 
wants – if it occurs at all. More work needs to be done in this area, though. While most other 
work ignores the possible role of side payments from a laggard coalition, Ward et al. (2001) 
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assume side payments are costless so as to highlight the most progressive equilibrium 
possible. Moreover, the benefits generated by the use of side payments are assumed to be non-
excludable; for example, a country wanting progress could do nothing and still benefit from 
others making side payments to bring it about. The model does not deal with the issue of 
collective action failure over who will pay for side payments to be made.  
 
3.5. Trust and networks can make a difference 
In reality, country A may be uncertain about whether country B is the type that genuinely 
wishes to conditionally cooperate or the type that only pretends to have such wishes (Kydd 
2007). If B’s actions significantly affect A’s payoffs, A may take a considerable risk in 
shifting energy paths, because it may take a long time to become sure that B is not 
reciprocating and then a long time to switch its own strategy. So initiating unilateral emission 
cuts, such as those under the EU’s 20% emissions cuts (the 20 20 20 by 2020 policy), is a 
gamble.
12
 Why take such a gamble? 
Countries’ background common knowledge of each other sets the a-priori probability that 
a country is of the type that actually wishes to conditionally cooperate in a game of 
incomplete information concerning others’ types. As the game progresses, a country may 
choose to send a costly signal that indicates its type, because only countries of this type would 
make such a move in equilibrium. Others update their prior beliefs about the country sending 
the signal, using what they can infer from the signal and the equilibrium; and these updated 
beliefs support the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole 1992, 207-241; 
Kydd 2007, 183-205).  Perhaps the EU’s “20 20 20 by 2020” policy is a signal of this sort. 
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 The Commission claims significant short-term economic benefits for the EU. 
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Urpelainen (2012) shows how states may signal whether they are the type that wishes to 
conditionally cooperate by imposing a tax on a domestic industry as long as the costs to the 
industry are large enough to deter the type of state that does not wish to cooperate from 
mimicking the signal. In international crises, states may attempt to reverse a potential 
escalation towards war by starting with relatively small cooperative gestures which, if 
reciprocated, lead to further de-escalatory steps (Osgood 1962). By starting small, states may 
both signal something about their type and learn a lot about others. A similar logic seems to 
underlie the design of the climate regime’s institutional architecture, whereby countries 
started with a framework convention, aiming to gradually impose tighter standards through 
adding protocols. 
In a game of this type, countries’ prior beliefs can be thought of as the degree of 
background trust they have in each other, and such trust is vital to whether they will risk 
conditional cooperation (Kydd 2007). Trust can arise during specific negotiations through 
“cheap talk” (Fudenberg and Tirole 1992, 361-362; Ostrom et al. 1994), but it also arises 
through numerous interactions, including those in other issue domains than climate. When 
countries meet each other in the course of routine diplomacy, by direct contact they learn 
about each other’s interests, capabilities and trustworthiness. They also create networks that 
enable them to learn about each other indirectly as information travels through the network. 
Countries that meet frequently, with many others and in many forums are central to the 
network, or highly embedded. They are in a position to learn most, but also to affect flows of 
information, giving them brokerage power (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009; Maoz 2010). Inter-
state networks are supplemented by networks between non-state actors such as NGOs, 
corporations, and scientific bodies, such as those that have come to exist in climate 
governance (Andonova et al. 2009). 
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Although networks should not be conceptually confused with trust or social capital 
(Ostrom and Ahn 2008; cf. Dasgupta 2008), there is strong evidence at the individual level 
that dense networks are often associated with higher levels of trust. Beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of countries central to dense networks will have lower variance. Moreover, 
because a highly embedded country is more involved in a range of international interactions, 
it has more to lose if its reputation for trustworthiness is harmed by failure to reciprocate on a 
single issue such as climate change. They may also be more influenced by evolving patterns 
of international norms (Florini 1996) and information cascades causing states’ perceptions of 
costs of action to decrease. There is also emerging empirical evidence from the environmental 
realm that that highly embedded countries act more cooperatively (Bernauer et al. 2010; Ward 
2006). 
 
3.6. Decentralized cooperation 
The general pessimism in the coalition and repeated-game literatures is shared by several 
studies considering whether unilateral emissions reductions by one or a few countries may 
cause other countries to follow suit. For example, Hoel (1991) and Bucholz et al. (1998) find 
that unilateral emissions reductions will unlikely cause other countries to follow suit and 
could even cause them to increase their own emissions. According to their view, unilateral 
action is at best pointless and at worst counterproductive.  
However, a few scholars have recently begun to question this pessimistic view of 
unilateral policies, arguing that unilateral action may be rational even for a government at the 
national, regional or local level (or even for an individual firm).
13
 For example, Urpelainen 
(2009) suggests that ancillary local benefits at the national, regional or local level can 
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 For an excellent informal account of the emergence of climate policy in the United States, see Rabe (2004). 
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motivate unilateral emissions reductions.
14
 Moreover, using a two-country, two-period model, 
Urpelainen (2011) shows how a ‘green’ government in country A may adopt a climate policy 
unilaterally in period 1, so as to bind a “brown” government in country A that could be 
elected in period 2. He also shows that this possibility is contingent both on the climate policy 
lowering mitigation costs and on what country B will do in period 2, which is contingent on 
election outcomes in country B. 
Luterbacher and Davis (2010) argue that, as an effective global climate agreement 
becomes more likely, the risks involved in holding on to carbon-intensive technologies will 
increase. Drawing on work by Milnor and Shapley (1978) on so-called “oceanic games” (i.e. 
games with an infinite number – an “ocean” – of players) and by Straffin Jr. (1977) on 
bandwagon effects in U.S. presidential nominations, they find that abandoning investments in 
carbon-intensive technologies might entail significant first-mover advantages. If some 
countries, regions, or municipalities begin to introduce regulation to limit the use of carbon-
intensive technologies, the risks for other countries, regions or municipalities of continued use 
of such technologies will increase. Thus, their incentive to switch to low-carbon technologies 
will also increase. If the size of the coalition of low-carbon countries reaches a certain level, a 
bandwagon effect may set in and cause a very rapid increase in the number of countries 
switching to low-carbon technologies. According to Luterbacher and Davis (2010), this 
bandwagon effect will be stimulated further if the coalition of low-carbon countries is able to 
use sanctions to motive other countries to join.  
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 On the other hand, using a coalition model Finus and Rübbelke (2012) find that ancillary benefits do not 
enhance the prospects of an efficient global climate agreement. Countries taking private ancillary benefits into 
account will reduce their emissions irrespective of whether an international agreement exists. Thus, when some 
countries take ancillary benefits into account, other countries will have weaker incentives to join the agreement 
than they would have if no countries were to take such effects into account. 
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3.7. Some lessons from the experimental literature on cooperation 
As very few climate agreements exist, the possibilities for using field data to test hypotheses 
about climate cooperation are limited. It is therefore interesting to explore other options. One 
such option is to use laboratory experiments. A significant number of such experiments have 
considered the conditions for public goods provision. What can these experiments learn us 
about the prospects for effective climate cooperation? 
The experimental literature on cooperation largely considers variations of the following 
game:
15
 N subjects endowed with z units of a numéraire good (usually money) decide 
simultaneously how much of their endowment they will keep for themselves and how much 
they will contribute to a public good for the subject group. Contributions are divided equally 
among all subjects after being multiplied by a factor between 1 and N. Assuming subjects are 
rational actors that maximize their own monetary payoff, the unique Nash equilibrium in this 
game is that every subject keeps its entire endowment and thus contributes nothing to the 
public good. This equilibrium is inefficient; all subjects would be better off if every subject 
were to contribute its entire endowment to the public good. 
Several experiments add an enforcement stage, allowing subjects to allocate punishment 
points to other subjects. One allocated punishment point normally detracts three units of the 
numéraire good from the punished player’s payoff and one unit from the punishing player’s 
payoff. Thus, punishment is costly both for the punished subject and for the punishing subject. 
The subgame-perfect equilibrium in the one-shot version of this public goods game with 
enforcement is that all subjects keep their entire endowment and that no subject is punished. 
                                                          
15
 This and the next few paragraphs draw extensively on Aakre et al (2014).  
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Experimental studies of such public goods games with enforcement (e.g. Fehr and 
Gächter 2000, 2002; Kosfeld et al. 2009) typically permit subjects to play the game a fixed 
number of times (usually 10). Given the above-mentioned assumptions, the subgame-perfect 
equilibrium in such a finitely repeated game is that every player keeps its entire endowment in 
every period, and that no punishment is imposed. 
Typically, the behavior observed in experiments deviates significantly from these 
equilibrium predictions. In experiments without an enforcement stage, average contributions 
typically begin at 40–60% of the endowment in the first period and then decreases to 10–15% 
by the last period. In experiments with an enforcement stage, average contributions typically 
start higher (at 60–70% of the endowment), and increase even further (often to 90–100%) by 
the last period. Thus, adding enforcement seems to influence behavior significantly, even 
when enforcement is costly to the enforcers. 
The mechanisms producing these results are not very well understood; however, a 
popular hypothesis is that motivational heterogeneity plays a major role. Quite a few subjects 
seem to be “reciprocators” (e.g. Fehr et al. 2002), who increase their current contribution if 
the average contribution in the preceding period was below their own, and reduce their current 
contribution if the average in the preceding period was above their own., The tendency of 
average contributions to decline over time is believed to stem from reciprocators’ 
underestimating the portion of purely self-regarding players (existing data suggest that this 
portion constitutes around one-third of the subject pool in modern societies). Reciprocators’ 
miscalculation concerning the subject pool causes them to make considerable contributions in 
the first period, and to reduce their contributions as they observe lower average contributions 
than they expected.  
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Experiments with enforcement permit subjects to discipline free riders. Subjects often 
allocate punishment points, even though such allocation is costly for the punishing subject. A 
common explanation is that “strong reciprocity” plays a role. A strong reciprocator is willing 
to forego monetary benefits to penalize subjects that do not cooperate.  If a purely self-
regarding player believes strong reciprocation is sufficiently widespread, and if allocation of 
punishment points is possible, contributing at a level that avoids punishment may well be a 
best response (see for example, Fehr and Fischbacher 2005; Gürerk et al. 2006). 
Experiments also indicate that the prospects for cooperation are better if climate change 
mitigation includes some degree of “lumpiness”. In particular, cooperation may be easier to 
sustain if a minimum amount of effort is required to avoid passing a catastrophic threshold. 
Barrett (2013) finds theoretically that this conclusion holds only provided that the location of 
the threshold is known and experiments conducted by Barrett and Dannenberg (2012) support 
this conclusion. Further experiments reported by Barrett and Dannenberg (2014) show that 
even an uncertain threshold induces subjects to increase their contributions but – importantly 
– not enough to avoid passing the threshold.16  
Other experimental studies have considered the conditions under which a deposit-refund 
system is likely to enhance climate cooperation. One major finding is that such systems may 
well be very effective in agreements having an entry-into-force clause that requires full 
participation. In contrast, they will likely be less effective (and might even be 
counterproductive) in agreements having an entry-into-force clause that does not require full 
participation (Cherry and McEvoy 2012). 
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 Other ideas involving lumpiness have been studied experimentally by McEvoy (2009). 
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Moreover, some experiments have addressed whether permitting subjects to vote over the 
nature of an entry-into-force clause influences cooperation. For example, Cherry et al. (2014) 
let subjects in a public goods game vote on the number of members required to form before 
they decide whether to join the agreement and contribute to the public good. They find that 
subjects tend to successfully introduce an efficient entry-into-force rule when full 
participation is optimal but not when less than full participation is optimal (i.e., when only a 
subset of countries are required to participate to solve the problem). They also find that 
introducing heterogeneous payoff functions aggravates this effect. 
Finally, experiments have also been used to consider the importance of equity concerns in 
the climate negotiations. For example, Dannenberg et al. (2010) conducted an online 
experiment with subjects who had experience from international climate policy. Using two 
non-strategic games to measure the subjects’ inequality aversion, they find that equity 
concerns do play a role, although regional differences in climate policy are driven more by 
differences in national interests than by differences in equity concerns.  
Assuming that lab experiments are relevant for international climate cooperation, several 
of these experimental results offer some reason for optimism. For example, they suggest that a 
potential for moderate cooperation levels may exist even without enforcement and that even 
very high cooperation levels may be sustainable with enforcement. Interestingly, enforcement 
seems to encourage cooperation even when it is based on threats that are not credible (in the 
narrow sense that they are costly to implement). The latter result could mean that the 
credibility requirements imposed in most formal models are excessively strict.  
 
4. Conclusions 
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The models considered in this paper offer two somewhat conflicting main messages. The 
first is that the prospects for effective climate cooperation are rather bleak. Climate change 
mitigation entails huge incentives for free riding and curbing those incentives successfully 
constitutes a formidable challenge. Many formal models suggest that a stable (self-enforcing) 
agreement is possible only if the number of signatories is (very) small or if the signatories’ 
commits are shallow. 
However, a second message is that a new and carefully designed climate agreement could 
nevertheless make a significant difference. We end by summarizing three general lessons 
about international climate cooperation and six more specific lessons about treaty design that 
can be derived from models reviewed in this article. 
The first general lesson is that each country’s best course of climate action is likely to 
depend on what other countries do. This interdependence provides a strong rationale for 
international coordination; in particular, it suggests that the efforts to design a new and more 
effective climate agreement should continue despite the rather disappointing achievements so 
far. In particular, unilateral climate policies – although certainly worthwhile as a supplement 
to international cooperation – cannot be expected to cut global emissions to the extent 
required to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. 
A second general lesson is that countries’ climate policies (or lack of such policies) are 
motivated to a considerable extent by incentives, that is, the costs and benefits generated by 
different policy options. Formal models of public goods provision suggest that curbing 
emissions of greenhouse gases are associated with strong incentives to free ride. The 
existence of such incentives provides a powerful explanation of what caused the climate 
change problem. Although countries’ behavior is certainly influenced also by other factors 
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(such as norms), the formal models literature suggests that changing the incentives to free ride 
must be part of any viable solution. 
Finally, the possibility of a climate threshold (beyond which catastrophic climate change 
will occur) might influence the prospects of climate cooperation. In particular, cooperation 
may be easier to sustain if some minimum amount of effort is required to avoid passing the 
threshold. Importantly, however, it seems that this conclusion holds only provided that the 
threshold’s location is known. The latter conclusion provides a caution for those who believe 
that the risk of a climate disaster will make countries more cooperative concerning climate 
change mitigation. 
However, equally interesting contributions of the models reviewed in this article concern 
more specific aspects of the design of a new and more effective climate treaty. Many results 
concerning such aspects contribute to mapping the conditions under which a particular design 
feature is likely to prove helpful. Identifying such conditions is one of the major strengths of 
formal models.  
First, a carefully chosen entry-into-force clause might help attract more signatories. A 
demanding clause is particularly likely to have this effect. Indeed, in a symmetric setting, an 
entry-into-force clause requiring all countries to participate may even be able to sustain full 
participation as an equilibrium. However, the real-world setting of climate negotiations is 
clearly not symmetric, so more research is needed on what type of entry-into-force clause may 
be expected to work best in asymmetric settings. 
Second, limiting the targets for emissions reductions can induce more countries to 
participate with binding emissions reduction commitments. Interestingly, a broad but shallow 
agreement can – given certain conditions – be more effective than a narrow but deep 
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agreement. This result suggests that negotiators might be well advised to choose a design with 
moderate targets − at least in the initial phases of a new climate treaty. 
Third, if countries are asymmetric – either in terms of their capacity for contributing to 
climate change mitigation or in terms of how much they benefit from such mitigation – 
progressive countries might be able to offer side payments to unattached countries, thereby 
making larger coalitions stable. However, if laggard countries can also offer side payments to 
unattached countries, they might be able to reduce or even nullify this positive effect on 
participation. 
Fourth, a new and more effective climate agreement will likely require potent 
enforcement. However, designing a potent enforcement system that is also politically feasible 
is a great challenge. Importantly, deterring only one type of free riding (e.g., noncompliance) 
may simply shift free riding to other types (such as non-ratification, ratification with no 
commitment, ratification with only a very shallow commitment, or withdrawal). To ensure a 
new climate agreement’s effectiveness, the enforcement system must therefore be able to 
deter all types of free riding. 
Fifth, and related to the previous point, formal models provide insights into the strengths 
and weaknesses of specific proposals for enforcement systems. For example, they have been 
used to study the possible merits of trade sanctions, of deposit-refund systems, and of 
enforcement based on specific reciprocity. The results establish the conditions under which 
different enforcement systems may or will be effective and highlight potential problems with 
each type of system. One major conclusion is that effective enforcement through issue-
specific reciprocity is possible and consistent with broad participation but requires rather 
intricate designs and probably presupposes too much flexibility to be politically attractive. 
Another is that a deposit-refund system might be able to ensure high compliance but would 
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likely have to be supplemented with other measures (such as some kind of trade restrictions) 
to ensure also high participation with deep commitments. 
Finally, an emerging branch of formal modeling considers how countries’ motivation 
influences the prospects for climate cooperation. In particular, these models study the effect of 
replacing the standard assumption that all countries are fully rational and purely self-
interested with an assumption that at least some countries are reciprocators or have a 
preference for equity. Such models entail far more optimistic results concerning the potential 
for cooperation than standard models do. In particular, they offer some encouragement to 
environmental NGOs and other green pressure groups: If such NGOs and pressure groups 
could convince the governments in sufficiently many countries that climate change is better 
seen in terms of equity or reciprocity than in terms of national interests, they would also 
significantly enhance the likelihood of effective climate cooperation.         
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